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This paper analyzes a randomized tax enforcement experiment in Denmark. In the base year, a stratified
and representative sample of over 40,000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment.
Half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited, while the rest were deliberately
not audited. The following year, "threat-of-audit" letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers
in both groups. Using comprehensive administrative tax data, we present four main findings. First,
we find that the tax evasion rate is very small (0.3%) for income subject to third-party reporting, but
substantial (37%) for self-reported income. Since 95% of all income is third-party reported, the overall
evasion rate is very modest. Second, using bunching evidence around large and salient kink points
of the nonlinear income tax schedule, we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax
evasion, but that this effect is small in comparison to avoidance responses. Third, we find that prior
audits substantially increase self-reported income, implying that individuals update their beliefs about
detection probability based on experiencing an audit. Fourth, threat-of-audit letters also have a significant
effect on self-reported income, and the size of this effect depends positively on the audit probability
expressed in the letter. All these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model
of (rational) tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self-reported and third-party reported
incomes.
Henrik J. Kleven
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An extensive literature has studied tax evasion and tax enforcement from both the theoretical
and empirical perspective. The theoretical literature follows on the work of Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), which builds on the Becker (1968) theory of crime and focuses on a situation
where a taxpayer decides how much income to report to the government facing a probability of
audit and a penalty for cheating. Under low audit probabilities and low penalties, the expected
return to evasion is high and the model then predicts substantial noncompliance. However, it
has been argued that this prediction is in stark contrast with the observation that compliance
levels are high in modern tax systems despite low audit rates and fairly modest penalties.1
This suggests that the standard economic model misses important aspects of the real-world
reporting environment. In particular, many have argued that observed compliance levels can
only be explained by psychological or cultural aspects of tax compliance such as social norms,
tax morale, patriotism, guilt and shame.2 In other words, taxpayers, despite being able to cheat,
are unwilling to do so for non-economic reasons.
While psychology and culture may be important in the decision to evade taxes, the standard
economic model deviates from the real world in another potentially important aspect: it focuses
on a situation with pure self-reporting. By contrast, all advanced economies make extensive use
of third-party information reporting whereby institutions such as employers, banks, investment
funds, and pension funds report taxable income earned by individuals (employees or clients)
directly to the government. As pointed out by Slemrod (2007), under third-party reporting,
the observed audit rate is a poor proxy for the probability of detection faced by a taxpayer
contemplating to engage in tax evasion, because systematic matching of information reports to
income tax returns will uncover any discrepancy between the two. Thus, taxpayers with only
third-party reported income may be unable to cheat on their taxes. Empirically, the U.S. Tax-
payer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) has documented that aggregate compliance
is much higher for income categories with substantial information reporting than for income
1Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) conclude at the end of their inuential survey that \the most signi-
cant discrepancy that has been documented between the standard economic model of compliance and real-world
compliance behavior is that the theoretical model greatly over-predicts noncompliance."
2Studies advocating the importance of behavioral, psychological, or cultural aspects of tax evasion include
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Cowell (1990), and Feld and
Frey (2002, 2006). A recent randomized experiment analyzed by Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (2001),
however, found that normative appeals to social norms and equity had no eect on compliance behavior.
1categories with little or no information reporting (Internal Revenue Service, 1996, 2006).
A large body of empirical work, surveyed by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), has tried to test other aspects of the standard model, in particular
the eects of audit probabilities and marginal tax rates on tax evasion. These eects are central
to tax policy and tax enforcement design. Most of the literature relies on observational and
non-experimental data, which creates serious measurement and identication issues,3 or on
laboratory experiments that do not capture key aspects of the real-world reporting environment
such as the presence of third-party information reporting.4
In this study, we rst extend the standard economic model of tax evasion to incorporate
the fact that the probability of detection varies with the type of income being under-reported
(third-party reported versus self-reported income). Our model predicts that evasion will be low
for third-party reported income items, but substantial for self-reported income items (as in the
standard model). The theory also predicts that the eects of tax enforcement (audits, penalties)
and tax policy (marginal tax rates) on evasion will be larger for self-reported income than for
third-party reported income. Second, we provide a comprehensive empirical test of this model
based on a large randomized eld experiment carried out in collaboration with the Danish tax
collection agency (SKAT) that overcomes the identication limitations of previous empirical
work. The experiment imposes dierent audit regimes on randomly selected taxpayers, and
has been designed to provide evidence on noncompliance as well as noncompliance responses to
tax enforcement and tax rates under dierent information environments (third-party reporting
versus self-reporting). Unlike previous studies|including the above-mentioned TCMP studies
in the United States|our data allow us to distinguish precisely between income items subject
to third-party reporting and income items subject to self-reporting for each individual in the
sample, and to measure treatment eects on those two forms of income separately.
The experiment was implemented on a stratied random sample of about 42,800 individual
taxpayers during the tax ling and auditing seasons of 2007 and 2008. In the rst stage,
taxpayers were randomly selected for unannounced tax audits of tax returns led in 2007. These
tax audits were comprehensive and any detected misreporting was corrected and penalized as
appropriate according to Danish law. The selected taxpayers were not aware that the audits
3Even the TCMP does not provide exogenous variation in audit probabilities or tax rates.
4An important exception is Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001) who analyze the eects of \threat-
of-audit" letters in a small eld experiment in Minnesota.
2were part of a special study. For taxpayers not selected for these audits, tax returns were
not examined under any circumstances. In the second stage, employees in both the audit and
no-audit groups were randomly selected for pre-announced tax audits of tax returns led in
2008. One group of taxpayers received a letter telling them that their return would certainly
be audited, another group received a letter telling them that half of everyone in their group
would be audited, while a third group received no letter. The second stage therefore provides
exogenous variation in the probability of being audited. The empirical analysis is divided into
three main parts.
The rst part studies the anatomy of tax compliance based on the misreporting uncovered
by tax inspectors in the rst-stage audits. We nd that the overall tax evasion uncovered by
audits is modest: about 1.8% of total reported income. But there is considerable variation
across income items depending on the information environment. For self-reported income, tax
evasion as a share of income is about 37%, whereas the tax evasion rate for third-party reported
income is only about 0.3%. Hence, the low evasion rate overall reects that almost all of
taxable income (95%) is subject to third-party information reporting where the probability of
detection is very high. It is important to keep in mind that these results capture only detectable
evasion and are therefore lower bound estimates of true evasion. This is primarily relevant for
self-reported income where traceability is relatively low, indicating that true evasion may be
substantially more skewed towards self-reported income. The ndings then suggest that overall
tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to
cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting. We also study the impact
of non-economic factors such as gender, age, marital status, church membership, and place
of residence that may serve as proxies for social and cultural factors. Consistent with earlier
studies, we nd that some of these variables are correlated with tax evasion. However, our
empirical analysis shows that the impact of these social variables is very modest in comparison
to variables that capture information and incentives to evade, namely the presence and size of
self-reported income or losses.
The second part estimates the eect of the marginal tax rate on evasion using quasi-
experimental variation in tax rates created by large and salient kinks in the nonlinear income
tax schedule. The eect of marginal tax rates on evasion is theoretically ambiguous, and ex-
isting empirical results have been very sensitive to specication due to data and identication
3problems. As showed by Saez (2009) and pursued by Chetty et al. (2009) on Danish data, the
compensated elasticity of reported income with respect to the marginal tax rate can be iden-
tied from bunching around kinks in progressive tax schedules. Comparing bunching evidence
in pre-audit and post-audit income allows us to separately identify compensated elasticities of
evasion versus legal avoidance. We nd that evasion elasticities for self-employment income and
stock-income are positive but small relative to the total elasticity. This implies that marginal
tax rates have only modest eects on tax evasion that are dwarfed by the third-party reporting
eects obtained in part one.
The third part studies the eect of tax enforcement on evasion. First, we consider the
eect of audits on future reported income by comparing the full-audit and no-audit groups in
the following year. Audits may aect future reported income by making taxpayers adjust their
perceived probability of detection when engaging in tax evasion. Consistent with our theoretical
model, we nd that audits have a strong positive impact on reported income in the following
year, with the eect driven almost entirely by self-reported income. This shows that audits have
substantial positive eects on tax collection through behavioral responses to a higher perceived
probability of detection. Second, we consider the eect of the probability of being audited on
reported income by comparing the threat-of-audit letter and no-letter groups. Because taxpayers
received the threat-of-audit letters shortly after receiving a pre-populated return containing
third-party information, we focus on the eect of letters on self-reported adjustments to the
pre-populated return. Consistent with the predictions of the standard economic model, we
nd that individuals receiving a threat-of-audit letter are more likely to adjust incomes on the
pre-populated return in an upward direction, and that the eects are stronger for the 100%
threat-of-audit letter than for the 50% letter.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing empirical literature. Section
3 presents a simple economic model of tax evasion with third-party reporting. Section 4 describes
the Danish income tax context, experimental design, and data. Section 5 analyzes the anatomy
of tax compliance. Section 6 estimates the eect of the marginal tax rate on evasion, while
Section 7 estimates of the eect of tax enforcement (prior audits, audit threats) on evasion.
Section 8 concludes.
42 Empirical Literature Review
A large body of empirical work has studied the link between tax evasion and tax rates, penal-
ties, audit probabilities, prior audit experiences, and socio-economic characteristics. Most of
this literature relies on observational and non-experimental data, which creates measurement
and identication problems. The measurement problem is that both the dependent variable|
evasion|and the independent variables|audits, threat of audits, penalties|are hardly ever
observed accurately because taxpayers go to great lengths to conceal their evasion and because
tax authorities do not make audit records or strategy publicly available except in aggregate
form. The identication problem is that, even where reasonable measures of evasion and its
various determinants have been available (mostly macro-data studies at the district or state
level), the variation in tax rates and enforcement eorts is not exogenous but rather an endoge-
nous response to compliance. This requires the use of instrumental variables.5 Andreoni, Erard,
and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) provide critical reviews of this literature
and argue that none of the available instruments are likely to satisfy the required exogeneity
assumptions.6
These generic problems motivate the use of an experimental approach to estimate evasion.
Three sources of experimental data have been explored in the literature. The rst source is the
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
The household TCMP is a program of thorough tax audits conducted on a stratied random
sample of personal income tax returns approximately every third year from 1963 to 1988.7 The
TCMP studies have provided very useful information regarding the extent of evasion and the
size of the tax gap, the dierence between taxes owed and taxes paid voluntarily and on a
timely basis. As pointed out by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Bloomquist (2003),
and Slemrod (2007), studies of TCMP data have shown that under-reporting is much higher
for income categories with \little or no" third-party reporting (such as business income) than
for income categories with \substantial" third-party reporting (such as wages and salaries).8
5Studies using district-level or state-level data on evasion and audit rates, and where an IV-strategy was
adopted to control for the endogeneity of the audit rate, include Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992), Dubin,
Graetz, and Wilde (1990), Dubin and Wilde (1988), and Pommerehne and Frey (1992).
6Recently, Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use charitable contributions to proxy for real incomes and evaluate
indirectly tax evasion across income components.
7A less detailed version of the household TCMP, called the National Research Program (NRP), was imple-
mented for the 2001 tax year.
8See also Klepper and Nagin (1989), Long and Swingden (1990), Christian (1994), and the Internal Revenue
5However, to our knowledge, no TCMP-based study has precisely and systematically compared
compliance rates for third-party reported income items and self-reported income items as we do
in this paper.9 Furthermore, TCMP does not provide useful exogenous variation in enforcement
variables. Because audits are not pre-announced, there is no variation in the audit probability.
Moreover, because audited taxpayers are told that they are participating in a special study and
that audit selection is random, TCMP cannot be used to study the eects of audits on future
reporting. The TCMP studies do not provide exogenous variation in the marginal tax rate to
study the eects of the marginal tax rate on evasion.
A second source of experimental data has been generated by laboratory experiments. These
are multi-period reporting games involving participants (mostly students) who receive and re-
port income, pay taxes, and face risks of being audited and penalized. Lab experiments have
consistently shown that penalties, audit probabilities, and prior audits increase compliance (e.g.,
Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg, 1978; Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking, 1987; Alm, Jackson,
and McKee, 1992a,b, 2008). But Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a,b) show that, when penalties
and audit probabilities are set at realistic levels, their deterrent eect is quite small and the
laboratory therefore tends to predict more evasion than we observe in practice. The key prob-
lem is that by its nature the lab environment is articial, and therefore likely to miss important
aspects of the real-world reporting environment. In particular, we are not aware of studies that
incorporates third-party institutions into laboratory experiments.
The third source of data concerns a small but unique randomized eld experiment involving
about 1700 taxpayers in Minnesota studied by Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001). Like
part of the experiment we analyze in this paper, the Minnesota experiment sent threat-of-audit
letters to taxpayers, thereby providing exogenous variation in the audit probability. As we
do, they found that the treatment eects are heterogeneous with respect to income level and
opportunities to evade. Surprisingly, they also found that a higher auditing probability lead
to a reduction in reported income at the top of the distribution (although this eect was not
statistically signicant).
Service (1996, 2006).
9This is because TCMP studies are based solely on individual income tax data and do not use information
returns. Most income lines on the individual tax return can include both third party reported and self-reported
income. For example, wages and salaries include earnings reported on W2 information returns but also tips that
are often never reported through information returns.
63 A Simple Economic Model of Tax Evasion
We consider a version of the Allingham-Sandmo (henceforth AS) model with risk neutral tax-
payers and an endogenous audit probability that depends on reported income.10 The basic
model is similar to models that have been considered in the literature, but we will present the
condition determining tax evasion in a slightly dierent manner in order to demonstrate that a
high degree of tax compliance is potentially consistent with a low audit probability and a low,
or even zero, penalty for evasion. We then introduce third-party information reporting into the
model and discuss its implications for the structure of the (endogenous) audit probability and
tax compliance behavior. Notice that the assumption of risk neutrality, besides simplifying the
analysis, makes our case harder because risk-neutral taxpayers are more inclined to evade than
risk-averse taxpayers.
We denote by  y the true income and by y the reported income of a representative taxpayer.
The probability that the government detects undeclared income  y   y through a tax audit is
given by p. The probability of detection will typically be lower than the probability of audit,
because tax audits may be unsuccessful in uncovering hidden income.11 We assume that the
probability of detection is a decreasing function of reported income, p = p(y) where p0 (y) < 0.12
The intuition for p0(y) < 0 is that, the more income the individual evades, the more likely is the
tax administration to suspect under-reporting or to obtain evidence that evasion took place and
hence carry out an audit. This ts well with the actual practices of professional tax preparers,
who calibrate the audit probability to the wishes of their clients by deciding how aggressively
to pursue a tax minimization strategy.
When evasion is detected, the taxpayer is forced to pay the evaded tax plus a penalty. The
tax rate is proportional to income and given by , and the penalty is proportional to the evaded
tax and given by . The risk-neutral taxpayer maximizes expected net-of-tax income, i.e.
u = (1   p(y))  [ y   y] + p(y)  [ y (1   )    ( y   y)]: (1)
10A number of previous studies have considered an endogenous audit probability, including the original paper
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1987), and the recent surveys by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and
Sandmo (2005).
11As in the original AS-model, we make the simplifying assumption that a tax audit either uncovers everything
or nothing; there is no middle ground where tax evasion is partially uncovered.
12Allingham and Sandmo (1972) also considered the case where p(:) depends on reported income y, whereas
Yitzhaki (1987) considered a case where p(:) depends on undeclared income  y   y. The results we show below
hold under either formulation.
7An interior optimum for reported income y satises the rst-order condition du=dy = 0, which
can be written as
[p(y)   p
0 (y)( y   y)](1 + ) = 1: (2)
The second-order condition to this problem puts a restriction on the second-order derivative of
p(y).13 If we denote undeclared income by e so that reported income is given by y =  y   e,





p =  p0 (y)
 y y
p  0.14 The rst-order condition determining reported income can then
be written as
p(y)  (1 + )  (1 + "(y)) = 1: (3)
The right-hand side of the rst-order condition is the marginal benet of an extra dollar of tax
evasion, while the left-hand side is the expected marginal cost of an extra dollar of tax evasion.
Under " = 0 as in the simplest model of evasion where p is independent of y, the expected
marginal cost equals the probability of detection p times the evaded tax plus penalty, 1 + .
The presence of the elasticity " in the formula reects that the taxpayer by evading one more
dollar incurs a higher probability of detection on all the infra-marginal units of tax evasion.
Interestingly, this simple model is consistent with less than full tax evasion even in the case of
a zero penalty, i.e.  = 0. In this case, partial evasion may be better than full evasion because
it involves a lower probability of being detected and having to pay the full statutory tax (but
no penalty).
The comparative statics of this type of model have been analyzed in the literature (see e.g.,
Yitzhaki, 1987). A higher penalty and a positive shift of the detection probability are both
associated with lower tax evasion. Moreover, as can be seen directly from (3), the marginal
tax rate has no impact on tax evasion. This result relies on the assumptions of risk-neutrality,
linear taxation, and a linear penalty in evaded tax. In particular, the combination of a linear
penalty and linear taxation implies that the substitution eect of the marginal tax rate is zero,
while risk-neutrality implies that the income eect is also zero. Under a nonlinear penalty, the
marginal tax rate will have a nonzero substitution eect with the sign of the eect depending
on the second-order derivative of the ne. Moreover, in a nonlinear tax system, an increase in
13The second-order condition is given by 2p0 (y)   p00 (y)( y   y) < 0. A sucient condition for this to hold is
that p(:) is convex so that p00 (y) > 0.
14We could alternatively dene the elasticity with respect to reported income y, but it simplies the expression
slightly to dene the elasticity with respect to undeclared income e   y   y.
8the marginal tax rate for a constant total tax liability can have a positive substitution eect
on evasion, although this is true only under an endogenous audit probability and the result
depends on the second-order derivative of the audit probability. In general, the substitution
eect of the marginal tax rate on evasion is theoretically ambiguous and its sign is an open
empirical question. Below we estimate the compensated evasion elasticity using evidence on
bunching around kink points in a nonlinear tax schedule.
The strongest critique of the economic model of tax evasion centers on its predictions of the









The fact that the observed p and  are very low is often argued to imply that it is privately
optimal for taxpayers to increase evasion and that they are therefore complying too much from
the perspective of the standard economic model. This reasoning ignores the important role of
"(y), and this is particularly important in a tax system using third-party information reporting.
As we will argue, the presence of third party reporting puts specic structure on the functions
p(y) and "(y).
Third-party reporting can be embedded in the model in the following way. Let true in-
come be given by  y =  yt +  ys, where  yt is subject to third-party reporting (wages and salaries,
interest income, mortgage payments, etc.) and  ys is self-reported (self-employment income, var-
ious deductions, etc.). For third-party reported income, assuming there is no collusion between
the taxpayer and the third party, the probability of detection will be close to 1 as systematic
matching of tax returns and information reports will uncover any evasion.15 By contrast, the
detection probability for self-reported income is very low because there is no smoking gun for
tax evasion and tax administrations have very limited resources to carry out blind audits.
Based on these observations, it is natural to assume that the probability of detection p(y) is
very high for y <  yt, very low for y >  yt, and decreases rapidly around y =  yt. Notice that these
properties rely on a specic sequence of income declaration for the taxpayer: as reported income
y is increased from 0 to  y, the taxpayer rst declares income with a high detection probability
15Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) study the issue of collusion and third-party reporting in detail, and
demonstrate that collusion cannot be sustained in large rms using veriable business records even with low
audit rates and penalties. However, collusion may be sustainable for suciently small rms and for rms o the
books.
9and then declares income with a low detection probability. Given that the tax rate and penalty
are the same across dierent income items, this is the optimal sequence for the taxpayer. These
remarks imply that the detection probability has a shape like the one shown in Figure 1, where
p(y) is initially very close to 1 and then decreases rapidly towards zero around the threshold
 yt.16
In this model, the taxpayer's optimum will be at a point to the right of  yt as shown in
the gure. At this equilibrium, the detection probability p(y) is much lower than 1
1+, but the
elasticity "(y) is very high as evasion is close to the level where third-party reporting binds. For
modern tax systems based on extensive use of information reporting ( ys= y is low), this model
predicts a low overall evasion rate (( y   y)= y   ys= y is low), a high evasion rate for self-reported
income (( y   y)= ys is high), and a low detection probability p(y) at the equilibrium. The model
also predicts that the deterrence eect of increased enforcement is small overall, but signicant
for self-reported income. We show below that this simple model is consistent with the empirical
ndings we obtain from the randomized tax audit experiment.
4 Context, Experimental Design, and Data
4.1 The Danish Income Tax and Enforcement System
The Danish tax system is described in Table 1. Panel A described the various tax bases and
Panel B describes the tax rate structure. Instead of applying a progressive rate structure to
a single measure of taxable income, the Danish tax system is based on a number of dierent
income concepts that are taxed dierently. Labor income rst faces a at rate payroll tax of 8%
that is always deducted when computing the other taxes, implying that the eective income tax
rate is only 92% of the statutory rate.
Both national and local income taxes are enforced and administered in an integrated system.
The national income tax is a progressive three-bracket system imposed on a tax base equal to
personal income (labor income, transfers, pensions, and other adjustments) plus capital income
16A microfoundation of the p-shape in the gure would allow for many income items, some of which are third-
party reported and some of which are self-reported. In general, let there be N third-party reported items with
true incomes  y1
t;:::;  yN
t , and let there be M self-reported items with true incomes  y1
s;:::;  yM
s . The N third-party
reported items have higher detection probabilities than the M self-reported items, but there is heterogeneity in
the probability across items in each group. As argued above, an optimizing taxpayer choosing total reported
income y will include income items sequentially such that the detection probability is decreasing in declared
income. In this case, it is natural to assume that the detection probability has a shape like the one showed in
Figure 1.
10if capital income is positive with marginal tax rates equal to 5.5%, 11.5%, and 26.5%. The
regional income tax is based on taxable income (personal income plus net capital income minus
deductions) above a standard exemption at a at rate that varies by municipality and is equal
to 32.6% on average. Finally, at the national level, stock income (dividends plus realized capital
gains from sales of corporate stock) is taxed separately by a progressive two-bracket system
with rates equal to 28% and 43%.
About 88% of the Danish population is liable to pay income tax, and all tax liable individuals
are required to le a return.17 Income tax ling occurs in the Spring of year t + 1 for income
earned in year t. By the end of January in year t+1, SKAT will have received most information
reports from third parties. Notice that such information reporting includes, but is not limited to,
income where taxes have been withheld at source during year t. Based on the third-party reports,
SKAT constructs pre-populated tax returns that are sent to taxpayers in mid-March. Other than
third-party information, the pre-populated return may contain additional `hard' information
that SKAT possesses such as an estimated commuting allowance based on knowledge of the
taxpayer's residence and work address. Upon receiving the pre-populated return, the taxpayer
has the option of making adjustments and submit a nal return before May 1.18 This ling
system implies that, for most tax lers, the dierence between income items on the nal return
and the pre-populated return is a measure of item-by-item self-reported income. However, there
are some exceptions where the pre-populated return contains certain elements of self-reporting
or where third-party reporting arrives too late to be included on the pre-populated return.
After each tax return has been led, a computer-based system generates audit ags based
on the characteristics of the return. Audit ags do not involve any randomness element and
are a deterministic function of the computerized tax information available to SKAT. Flagged
returns are looked at by a tax examiner, who decides whether or not to instigate an audit based
on the severity of ags, local knowledge, and resources. The audit rate for the entire population
of individual tax lers is 4.2%.19 Audits may generate adjustments to the nal return and
17The group of citizens who are not tax liable and therefore not required to le a return consists mostly of
children under the age of 16 who have not received any taxable income over the year.
18New returns can be submitted by phone, internet, or mail, and the taxpayer may keep ling new returns all
the way up to the deadline, only the last return counts. If no adjustments are made, the pre-populated return
counts as the nal return.
19These audits vary with respect to their breadth and depth, and the audit rate may therefore overstate the
intensity of auditing. This is important to keep in mind when comparing the Danish audit rate to audit rates
in other countries such as the United States where the audit rate is lower.
11a tax correction. In the case of underreporting, the taxpayer has the option of paying taxes
owed immediately or postponing the payment at an interest. If the underreporting is viewed
by the tax examiner as attempted fraud, a ne may be imposed. In practice, such nes a rare
because it is dicult to draw the line between honest mistakes and deliberate fraud. Repeated
underreporting for the same item increases the penalty applied. An audit may alternatively
nd over-reporting, in which case excess taxes are repaid with interest.
4.2 Experimental Design
The experiment we analyze was implemented by SKAT on a stratied random sample of 25,020
employees and 17,764 self-employed.20 The sample of employees was stratied according to
tax return complexity, with a higher sampling rate for employees with high-complexity returns
(`heavy' employees) and lower sampling rate for employees with low-complexity returns (`light'
employees).21 The experimental treatments and their timing are shown in Figure 2.
The experiment was implemented in two stages during the ling and auditing seasons of
2007 and 2008. In the rst stage, taxpayers were randomly assigned to a 100% audit group and
a 0% audit group. All taxpayers in the 100% audit group were subjected to unannounced tax
audits of tax returns led in 2007 (for 2006 income), meaning that taxpayers were unaware at
the time of ling that they had been selected for an audit. These tax audits were comprehensive
in the sense that every item on the return was examined, and the audits used up 21% of all
resources devoted to tax audits in 2007.22 Audited taxpayers were not told that the audits were
part of a special study. In the case of detected misreporting, the tax liability was corrected and
a penalty possibly imposed depending on the nature of the error and as appropriate according
to Danish law. Taxpayers in the 0% audit group were never audited even if the characteristics
of the return would normally have triggered an audit.23
Although SKAT intended to audit all taxpayers in the 100% audit group, the actual audit
20The `employee' category include transfer recipients such as retired and unemployed individuals, and would
therefore be more accurately described as `not self-employed'.
21Besides the stratications with respect to employment status (employee/self-employed) and tax return com-
plexity (light employee/heavy employee), an additional stratication was made with respect to geographical
location. The geographical stratication ensured that the same number of taxpayers was selected from each of
the 30 regional tax collection centers in Denmark.
22SKAT made considerable eort to ensure a uniform and thorough auditing procedure across all taxpayers
in the full-audit group. This included organizing training workshops for the tax examiners involved in the
experiment, and providing detailed auditing manuals to each examiner.
23However, SKAT did maintain the option of carrying out retrospective audits after the completion of the
experiment.
12rate was in fact a bit lower than 100%. This is because some tax returns were impossible
to audit due to special circumstances such as individuals dying, leaving the country, or being
unreachable for some other reason. In the empirical analysis below, estimates are always based
on the entire 100% audit group (including those who could not be audited), so that we are
measuring intent-to-treat eects rather than treatment eects. As the actual audit rates were
98.7% for employees and 92% for self-employed individuals, our estimates are very close to
actual treatment eects.24
Moreover, despite the large amount of resources spent on the experimental audits, they are
unlikely to uncover all tax evasion for all taxpayers, and our results therefore provide lower
bounds on total individual income tax evasion. The same issue arises in the TCMP studies
in the United States, which blow up tax evasion uncovered by audits (and without the help of
third-party information returns) by a multiplier factor of 3.28 to arrive at the ocial tax evasion
estimates. Unfortunately, this blowing-up factor is large and has a very large measurement error,
so that total tax evasion rates are at best rough approximations.25 In this study, we therefore
focus solely on detectable tax evasion.
In the second stage, individuals in both the 100% audit and 0% audit groups were randomly
selected for pre-announced tax audits of tax returns led in 2008 (for 2007 income). This part of
the experiment was implemented only for the employees since it was administratively infeasible
for SKAT to include the self-employed. The pre-announcements were made by ocial letters
from SKAT sent to taxpayers one month prior to the ling deadline on May 1, 2008.26 A third
of the employees in each group received a letter telling them that their return would certainly
be audited, another third received a letter telling them that half of everyone in their group
would be audited, and the nal third received no letter. The second stage therefore provides
exogenous variation in the probability of being audited, conditional on having been audited in
24We prefer to present intent-to-treat eects rather than treatment eects (which would be obtained by running
a 2SLS regression on actual audit and using treatment group as an instrument), because the impossibility to
audit some returns reects actual limitations in the real-world auditing environment.
25The 3.28 factor was based on a survey of taxpayers from the TCMP survey in 1976. Obviously, such self-
reported levels of undetected tax evasion are likely to be very noisy. In addition to this blowing up factor,
the Internal Revenue Service has developed special surveys designed to measure specically under-reported tip
income and informal supplier income. See Internal Revenue Service, 1996, pp. 20-21 and pp. 41-43 for complete
details.
26The pre-populated returns are administered around mid-March after which taxpayers are allowed to le
their tax return. When the pre-announcement letters were delivered, some taxpayers (around 17%) had already
led a new return. However, as explained in the previous section, taxpayers are allowed to change their returns
all the way up to the deadline. Only the nal report is considered by tax examiners. The letters emphasized
this possibility of changing the report.
13the rst stage or not. The audit probability is 100% for the rst group, 50% for the second
group, and equal to the current perceived probability in the third group.
The wording of the threat-of-audit letters was designed to make the message simple and
salient. The wording of the 100% (50%, respectively) letter was the following: \As part of
the eort to ensure a more eective and fair tax collection, SKAT has selected a group of
taxpayers|including you|for a special investigation. For (half the) taxpayers in this group,
the upcoming tax return for 2007 will be subject to a special tax audit after May 1, 2008.
Hence, (there is a probability of 50% that) your return for 2007 will be closely investigated. If
errors or omissions are found, you will be contacted by SKAT." Both types of letter included
an additional paragraph saying that \As always, you have the possibility of changing or adding
items on your return until May 1, 2008. This possibility applies even if you have already made
adjustments to your return at this point."
After returns had been led in 2008, SKAT audited all taxpayers in the 100%-letter group
and half of all taxpayers (selected randomly) in the 50%-letter group. However, to save on
resources, these audits were much less rigorous than the rst round of audits in 2007. Hence,
we do not show results from the actual audits in 2008, but focus instead on the variation in
audit probabilities created by the threat-of-audit letters.
4.3 Data
The data is obtained from SKAT's Business Object Database, which contains all information
available to SKAT concerning each taxpayer. This includes all income items from the third-
party information reports and from the pre-populated, led, and audited tax returns for each
year and each taxpayer. For the 2007 ling season (2006 income), we extract item-by-item
income data from the third-party information report (I), the pre-populated return (P), the led
return (F), and the after-audit return (A). For the 2008 ling season (2007 income), we extract
income data from the third-party information report (I), the pre-populated return (P) and
the led return (F).We also extract variables from the computer-generated audit ag system
(presence and number of ags) on which audit decisions would normally be based. Finally, the
database contains a limited number of socio-economic variables such as age, gender, residence,
and marital status. For employees, we also extracted information on the industrial sector of the
employer (22 categories) and the total number of employees at the rm.
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5.1 Overall Compliance
This section analyzes data from the baseline audits of tax returns led in 2007 for incomes earned
in 2006 in the 100% audit group. Table 2 presents various audit adjustments statistics for total
income dened as the sum of third-party and self-reported incomes in Panel A, and for third-
party and self-reported income separately in Panel B. Starting with total net income and total
tax at the top of the tables, those statistics are then presented by specic income components in
lower rows. For each row, Panel A shows the percent of tax lers with non-zero income (column
(1)), average reported income before audit (column (2)), the total audit adjustment (column
(3)), the audit adjustment due to under-reporting (column (4)), and the audit adjustment due
to over-reporting (column (5)). All amounts are reported in Danish Kroner and standard errors
are shown in parentheses. The statistics have been calculated using population weights to reect
averages in the full population of tax lers in Denmark.
Total net income is equal to 206,000 kroner on average (around $40,000), and the total tax
liability before audit adjustments is equal to about 70,000, corresponding to an average tax rate
of 34%. The single most important component of income is personal income, which includes
earnings, transfers, pensions, and other adjustments (see Table 1 for a detailed denition).27
Personal income is reported by 95.2% of tax lers and the average amount is close to total net
income as the other components about cancel out on average. Capital income is negative on
average mainly due to mortgage interest payments and is also very common. Capital income
is equal to about -5% of total net income and about 94% of tax lers report non-zero capital
income. Deductions also represent about -5% of net income, but only 60% of tax lers report
deductions. Stock income constitutes less than 3% of net income and is reported by about 22%
of tax lers. Self-employment income is about 5% of net income and is reported by 7.6% of tax
lers.
Note that each of the components of net income are themselves the sum of single line items
(which correspond to specic boxes on the tax return). A given line item is either always positive
(such as interest income received) or always negative (such as mortgage interest payments).
As we shall see, for third party reported items, the distinction between positive line items
27In all tables, the personal income variable includes only earnings by employees, while earnings by the self-
employed are reported separately as part of self-employment income.
15and negative line items is critical. Therefore, we split net income into \positive income" and
\negative income" dened as the sum totals of all the positive and negative income components,
respectively.
Column (3) shows that the adjustment amounts are positive for all categories, implying that
taxpayers do indeed evade taxes.28 These adjustments are strongly statistically signicant in
all cases, except for capital income where detected tax evasion is very small. Total detectable
tax evasion can be measured by the adjustment of net income and is equal to 3,744 kroner
(about $750), corresponding to about 1.8% of net income. The tax lost through detectable tax
evasion is 1,670 kroner, or 2.4% of total tax liability.29 Considering the positive and negative
income items separately, the evasion rate is 1.4% for positive income and 0.8% for negative
income (in absolute value). Hence, overall tax evasion appears to be very small in Denmark
despite the high marginal tax rates described in the previous section. However, the low evasion
rates reported above masks substantial heterogeneity across dierent income components, with
evasion rates equal to 1.1% for personal income, 1.4% for capital income (in absolute value),
1.4% for deductions (in absolute value), 4.9% for stock income, and 8.1% for self-employment
income. We come back to the reasons for this heterogeneity below.
The audit adjustments discussed so far reect a combination of upward adjustments (under-
reporting) and downward adjustments (over-reporting), which are reported separately in columns
(4) and (5). We see that under-reporting takes place in all income categories, and that the
detected under-reporting is always strongly signicant. The heterogeneity across income cat-
egories follows the same pattern as for the total adjustment. The amounts of over-reporting
are always small but statistically signicant in most income categories. The small amount of
over-reporting most likely reects honest mistakes resulting from a complex tax code and the
associated transaction costs with ling a tax return correctly.30
28For negative items (such as mortgage interest payments included in capital income for example), a positive
adjustment means that the absolute value of the mortgage interest payment was reduced. We use this convention
so that upward adjustments always mean higher net income (and hence higher net tax liability).
29Estimated under-reporting from the TCMP study for the US individual income tax for 1992 is 13.2% of
total tax liability (Internal Revenue Service, 1996, Table 6, row 3, p .13). However, as discussed above, this
factor includes a multiplier factor of 3.28 of detected under-reporting so that actual under-reported income in
the US should be around 4%, higher than in Denmark but not overwhelmingly so.
30Notice that the Danish system of pre-populated tax returns described in Section 4 implies that tax return
ling is not in itself associated with transaction costs (because the taxpayer can always choose to do nothing,
in which case the pre-populated return is automatically led). Transaction costs are incurred only by investing
the time and/or money to ensure a correct ling.
165.2 Self-Reported vs. Third-Party Reported Income
Each income category in Table 2 consists of some income items that are self-reported and
other income items that are subject to third-party reporting. But the prevalence of information
reporting varies substantially across income categories, with substantial third-party reporting for
earnings and personal income at one end of the spectrum and very little third-party reporting for
self-employment income at the other end of the spectrum. The results described above therefore
suggest that evasion rates are higher when there is little third-party reporting, consistent with
the ndings of the TCMP studies in the United States discussed in Section 2. A key advantage
of our data is that it allows an exact breakdown of income into third-party reported income and
self-reported income, facilitating a more rigorous analysis of the role of third-party reporting for
tax compliance. We present such an analysis in Panel B of Table 2 which displays the amount of
third-party reported income (column (6)), the amount of third-party under-reporting (column
(7)), the amount of self-reported income (column (8)), and the amount of self-reported under-
reporting (column (9)).
Columns (6) and (8) show that the use of third-party reporting is very pervasive in Denmark.
For total net income, third-party reporting constitutes about 95% of income while self-reporting
is responsible for only 5%. The share of third-party reporting in total positive income is 92%
and its share in total negative income is 74%. While the widespread use of third-party reporting
indicate that detection probabilities are very high on average, there is considerable heterogene-
ity across income components. For personal income, third-party reporting constitutes more
than 100% of total income as self-reported income includes certain negative adjustments and is
negative on average. Capital income reported by third-parties is negative on net due to interest
payments on mortgages, bank loans, etc., and is more than 100% of total negative capital in-
come as self-reported capital income is positive (but relatively small). For the remaining income
components, the share of third-party reporting is 62.3% for deductions, 67.1% for stock income,
and only 11.2% for self-employment income. It is interesting to note that third-party reporting
is not strictly zero even for self-employed individuals. An example of third-party reporting for
self-employed individuals would be an independent contractor working for a rm (but not as a
formal employee), which reports the contractor compensation directly to the government. The
fact that self-employment income consists of both self-reported income and third-party reported
income is useful, because it will allow us to explore the separate implications of third-party in-
17formation versus being self-employed.
We split total tax evasion into under-reporting of self-reported income and under-reporting
of third-party reported income. As mentioned above, we observe line-by-line income amounts
in the information report (I), the led tax return (F), and the audit-adjusted report (A). Each
report consists of line items that are either always positive (as in the case of earnings) or always
negative (as in the case of deductions and losses). Consider rst the always-positive line items
(such as regular wage earnings for example). We can say that under-reporting of third-party
income took place if the individual reported less on her return than what is obtained from
third-party reports and there was a subsequent upward audit adjustment. Formally, if we have
F < A < I, then third-party cheating is equal to A F. If we have F < I  A, then third-party
cheating is equal to I   F. In all other cases (i.e., if either A  F < I or F  I), third-party
cheating is zero. Given this procedure, we measure under-reporting of self-reported income as
the residual dierence between total under-reporting and third-party under-reporting.
Consider next the always-negative line items such as losses and deductions. If the taxpayer
reports larger losses and deductions (in absolute value) than what is obtained from third-party
reports and then receives an upward audit adjustment (i.e., is denied part or all of those extra
losses), this may reect self-reported under-reporting (that is later denied in the audit) or trying
to misreport third-party reported losses or deductions. Our data do not allow us to separate
between the two. It is possible to estimate an upper bound for third-party cheating by saying
that, if F < I = A, then we can call I   F third-party cheating. However, this upper bound is
likely to capture mostly self-reported cheating and is therefore not very useful. Therefore, we
will dene third-party under-reporting only for positive income items.31
We nd a very strong variation in tax evasion depending on the information environment.
For third-party reported income, the evasion rate is always very small: it is equal to 0.2% for
total positive income and between 0.2% and 0.9% across all the dierent categories. Interest-
ingly, the evasion rate for self-employment income conditional on third-party reporting is only
0.9%, suggesting that tax evasion among the self-employed is large because of the information
environment and not because of other aspects of being self-employed (such as the absence of
31For negative items, we can say with condence that a reporting error in the third party category took place
only if reported deductions/losses are smaller (in absolute value) than third-party reported deductions/losses
and there is a subsequent audit adjustment. However, such mis-reporting is by denition unfavorable to the
taxpayer and leads to a downward audit adjustment. Such events are extremely rare.
18withholding or preferences). By contrast, tax evasion for self-reported income is substantial:
the evasion rate for total positive income is 15.8%. For the dierent subcomponents, the evasion
rates are equal 8.7% for capital income, 14.9% for stock income, and 11.6% for self-employment
income. Notice that the evasion rate for self-employment income is not particularly high com-
pared to the other forms of income once we condition on self-reporting. For total self-reported
net income, the tax evasion rate is equal to 36.9%. Because self-reported net income consists
of positive amounts and negative amounts that just about cancel on average (self-reported net
income is quite small), measuring tax evasion as a share of self-reported net income may give
an exaggerated representation of the evasion rate. On the other hand, and as discussed earlier,
these estimates capture only detectable evasion and are therefore lower bounds on true evasion.
This is especially important for self-reported income where there is very little traceable evidence
that can provide a smoking gun for evasion, implying that true evasion rates are likely to be
even more skewed towards self-reported income.
The strong association between tax evasion and third-party information is strongly suggestive
that information reporting is crucial for compliance, although we should obviously be cautious
in making causal statements in the absence of exogenous variation in information reporting.32
Another potential caveat in interpreting the results is that, since third-party reporting often
goes hand in hand with income tax withholding, it is not a priori clear whether the variation
in tax evasion is driven mostly by one or the other.33 As mentioned above, the fact that the
evasion rate for self-employment income (which is never withheld at source) is very low in the
presence of third-party information suggests that information reporting is more important than
withholding. To explore this point further, Table 3 breaks down third-party reported income
into items that are also subject to withholding (mainly earnings, pensions, and transfers) and
items that are not (such as third-party reported self-employment income and stock income).
The table shows that, once there is information reporting, evasion rates are always very small
whether or not there is also withholding. The evasion rate is 0.2% in the presence of withholding
and 2.1% in the absence of withholding. While these results cannot rule out an independent
32Variation in information reporting across dierent income items may be correlated with unobserved factors
(such as heterogeneous preferences across individuals with dierent forms of income) that have an impact on tax
evasion on their own. While we cannot rule out such eects, it appears implausible that the strong association
between evasion and information is entirely non-causal.
33The U.S. TCMP studies note that income items subject to both withholding and third-party reporting have
lower evasion rates than income items subject solely to third-party reporting (IRS, 1996, 2006).
19eect of withholding on compliance, they do suggest that third-party reporting is the more
crucial element in eective enforcement.
To summarize these results, tax evasion is very low overall and equal to about 1.8% of total
income. The low evasion rate overall reects that almost all of taxable income (95%) is subject
to third-party information reporting where the probability of detection is very high and tax
evasion is essentially zero. Once we zoom in on purely self-reported income, tax evasion rates
are substantial. Although self-reported income constitutes only about 5% of total income, it is
responsible for 87% of detected tax evasion. These results suggest that overall tax evasion is low,
not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat successfully
due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.
5.3 Social versus Information Factors
To explore the role of social, economic, and informational factors in determining noncompliance,
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of an audit adjustment dummy on a number of
dummy covariates. The regressions are run for the full-audit group using population weights, and
consider adjustments in total net income as the dependent variable. Panel A (columns (1)-(4))
shows results for a basic set of explanatory variables, while Panel B (columns (5)-(8)) considers
a richer set of explanatory variables. Column (1) considers ve social variables: gender, marital
status, church membership, geographical location (dummy for living in the capital Copenhagen),
and age (dummy for being older than 45 years of age). The table shows that being female
and a church member are both negatively associated with noncompliance, while being married
is positively associated with noncompliance. The eects of location and age are small and
insignicant. Column (2) adds three socio-economic variables: home ownership, rm size (a
dummy for working in a rm with less than 10 employees), and industrial sector (a dummy for
working in the \informal" sector dened as agriculture, forestry, shing, construction, and real
estate).34 Being a home owner, working in a small rm, and working in the informal sector are
all positively associated with noncompliance.
Column (3) considers information-related tax return factors, in particular the presence and
size of self-reported income: a dummy for having non-zero self-reported income, a dummy for
having self-reported income above 20,000 kroner, and a dummy for having self-reported income
34The informal sector classication is meant to capture industries that are generally prone to informal activities.
20below -10,000 kroner. We also include a dummy for having been agged by the computer-
based audit selection system (described in Section 4), because audit ags are to a large extent
a (complex) function of self-reported income. The results show very strong eects of all these
information-related tax return variables. Column (4) brings all the variables together in order
to study their relative importance. The results show that by far the strongest predictors of
evasion are the variables capturing self-reported income. The eect of rm size is also fairly
strong and signicant, while the eect of \informal" industrial sector becomes insignicant. As
for the social variables, the negative eects of female gender and church membership are now
smaller although they remain signicant, while the strong positive eect of home ownership
disappears. There is a small but signicant eect of marital status, whereas location and age
are insignicant.
It is illuminating to consider the R-squares and adjusted R-squares across the dierent
specications. The specication including only self-reported income variables explains about
17.1% of the variation, while the specication with only socio-economic factors explains just
about 2.1%. Adding socio-economic variables to the specication with tax return variables
have almost no eect on the R-square. This provides suggestive evidence that information, and
specically the presence and size of income that is dicult to trace, is the most central aspect
of the compliance decision.
In columns (5)-(8), we investigate whether these ndings are robust to including a much
richer set of explanatory variables. Besides the basic variables described above, we include 6
location dummies (corresponding to the 6 main geographical areas of Denmark), 4 age group
dummies, 5 rm size dummies, 22 industry sector dummies, 6 income group dummies, dummies
for having non-zero self-employment income, capital income, stock income, and deductions,
and nally a dummy for having experienced an audit adjustment in the two years prior to
the experiment. The overall conclusions are the same as above. Although several of the socio-
economic variables are signicant, the largest eects by far are driven by tax variables capturing
information: the presence and size of self-reported income and self-employment income, the
audit ag dummy, and prior audit adjustments. As before, the R-squares show that social
variables explain a very small part of the variation, while tax return variables explain a much
larger part of the variation. This conrms the conclusion from above that information and
traceability are central to the compliance decision.
21In sum, these descriptive ndings conrm the general conclusion from Table 2 that self-
reported vs. third-party reported income is the critical distinction for tax evasion. It should
be noted however that several social variables continue to have a signicant impact on eva-
sion, although relatively small in magnitude, even after controlling for tax-related information
variables.
6 The Eect of the Marginal Tax Rate on Evasion
The eect of marginal tax rates on tax evasion is a central parameter for tax policy design. As
discussed earlier, the eect of the marginal tax rate on tax evasion is theoretically ambiguous,
not just because of income eects, but because the substitution eect can be either positive
or negative depending on the structure of penalties, taxes, and detection probabilities. In
this section, we try to sign the substitution eect by presenting evidence on the compensated
elasticity of tax evasion with respect to the marginal tax rate.
An early study of this important parameter is provided by Clotfelter (1983), who estimates
the responsiveness of evasion to the marginal tax rate and income using cross-sectional variation
from the 1969 TCMP in the United States. He nds large positive eects of both tax rates and
income on evasion. An issue with this approach is that the cross-sectional variation in individual
marginal tax rates is driven mostly by income, so that there is very little independent variation
in the two variables of interest. To deal with this issue, Feinstein (1991) considers pooled
data from the 1982 and 1985 TCMPs, thereby allowing for independent variation in the two
variables created by changes in tax rates over time for a given level of income. In sharp contrast
to Clotfelter's results, Feinstein nds a substantial negative eect of the marginal tax rate on
evasion. A broad concern with these approaches is that the observed tax rate variation is likely
to be endogenous due to both unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity in the determination
of tax rates and evasion. We therefore follow a dierent approach using the quasi-experimental
variation created by the discontinuity in marginal tax rates around kinks in the tax schedule.
The Danish tax system described in Section 4.1 consists of two separate piecewise linear
schedules: a three-bracket income tax and a two-bracket stock income tax. The most signicant
kinks are created by the top bracket threshold in the income tax (where the marginal tax
increases from 49% to 62%) and the bracket threshold in the stock income tax (where the
marginal tax increase from 28% to 43%). Economic theory predicts that taxpayers will respond
22to such jumps in marginal tax rates by bunching at the kink points. Saez (2009) shows that
the amount of bunching is proportional to the compensated elasticity of reported income with
respect to the net-of-tax rate since the identifying variation is driven by a discontinuous jump
in the marginal tax rate with no change in the (continuous) tax burden around the kink. Saez
(2009) develops a simple method to estimate the elasticity using bunching evidence. This
method has been recently pursued on Danish data by Chetty et al. (2009), who nd evidence of
substantial bunching around the top kink in the income tax system. We also consider the top
kink in the income tax, focusing on individuals with self-employment income where evasion is
substantial and a signicant evasion response is a priori likely. Moreover, we consider the kink
in the stock income tax, since this kink is also large and much of stock income is self-reported
and therefore prone to evasion. Our key contribution to the existing bunching literature and
to the tax responsiveness literature more generally is that the combination of pre-audit and
post-audit data allows us to break down total behavioral responses into evasion responses and
legal avoidance responses.35
To evaluate the importance of bunching, Figure 3 plots empirical distributions of taxable
income (excluding stock-income) in Panel A and stock income in Panel B around the major
cutos in the income tax and stock income tax schedules described above. Panel A shows the
empirical distributions of pre-audit taxable income (black curve) and post-audit taxable income
(grey curve) for the self-employed in 2006 around the top kink at 318,700 kroner (vertical line).
The gure has been constructed by grouping individuals into 3000 kroner bins and plotting the
number of taxpayers in each bin. Consistent with Chetty et al. (2009), we see very strong
bunching in led (pre-audit) incomes around the kink, with almost 5 times as many taxpayers
in the bin around the kink as in the surrounding bins. This provides clear evidence of an overall
taxable income response to taxation, which may reect evasion, avoidance, or real responses.
To isolate the evasion response, we turn to the distribution of post-audit income. Here we
continue to see bunching, but to a smaller extent than for pre-audit income. The dierence
in bunching in the two distributions provides evidence of an evasion response to the marginal
tax rate. The bunching that remains in the post-audit distribution reects real responses and
avoidance purged of the (detectable) evasion response.
35This distinction is relevant both because the eciency implications of evasion and avoidance in general are
not the same (Slemrod, 1995; Chetty, 2009), and because the evasion response to the marginal tax rate may
provide a better understanding of the correct modeling of tax evasion and enforcement.
23Panel B shows the empirical distributions of pre-audit stock income (black curve) and post-
audit stock income (grey curve) for all taxpayers in 2006 around the kink at 88,600 kroner
(vertical line).36 As before, we consider a grouping individuals into 3000 kroner bins. For stock
income, we nd even stronger evidence of bunching, with about 10 times as many taxpayers
in the bin around the kink point as in the surrounding bins. However, we see essentially no
dierence between the pre-audit and post-audit distributions, suggesting that the bunching
eect reects mostly avoidance and not (detectable) evasion. The view among tax inspectors
at SKAT is that the strong bunching in stock income is driven almost exclusively by dividends
from non-traded stock, which can be easily adjusted by owners of closely held corporations to
achieve bunching. This type of response is indeed legal avoidance and not evasion.
Table 5 uses the bunching evidence to estimate elasticities of tax evasion and tax avoidance
for self-employment income (Panel A) and stock income (Panel B). The rst row in each panel
shows the fraction of individuals bunching (dened as having an income within 1,500 kroner of
the kink) among individuals within 40,000 kroner of the kink. The second row in each panel
shows compensated elasticities using the method set out in Saez (2009). This method is based
on comparing the actual distribution to a counterfactual distribution estimated by excluding
observations in a band around the kink. The dierence between the actual and counterfactual
distributions gives an estimate of excess mass around the kink point, which can be compared
to the size of the jump in the net-of-tax rate in order to infer the elasticity. The identifying
assumption is that, in the absence of the discontinuous jump in tax rates, there would have
been no spike in the density distribution at the kink. This assumption seems reasonable in light
of the evidence in Figure 3, which would be hard to explain by anything other than the tax
system.37
As shown in Table 5, the estimated elasticity of pre-audit taxable income for the self-
employed is equal to 0.14, while the elasticity of post-audit taxable income equals 0.09. The
dierence between the two is the compensated evasion elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax
rate and is equal to 0.05. All of these estimates are strongly signicant. For stock income,
36For married lers, the stock income tax is assessed jointly, and the bracket threshold in the gure is the one
applying to such joint lers. For single lers, the bracket threshold is half as large at 44,300 kroner. We have
aligned single and married lers in the gure by multiplying the stock income of singles by two.
37The assumption can be tested with several years of data and variation in the kink point over time. Chetty et
al. (2009) show that the bunching at the top kink in the income tax moves closely with changes in the threshold
level over the years 1994-2001. Similarly, Kleven and Schultz (2010) show that the bunching at the kink in the
stock income tax moves closely with changes in that threshold over the years 1997-2005.
24elasticities are much larger. The elasticity of pre-audit stock income is about 2.24 and strongly
signicant. The elasticity of post-audit stock income is equal to 1.99, implying an elasticity of
evasion equal to 0.25. However, this elasticity is not statistically signicant. Finally, as dis-
cussed in Saez (2009), this estimation technique may be sensitive to the bandwidth around the
kink used to estimate the elasticities, especially in situations where the clustering of taxpayers
at the kink is not very tight. The last column of the table explores this possibility by consid-
ering a smaller sample around the kink. We nd that the estimates are not very sensitive to
bandwidth, and this is precisely because the bunching in the Danish tax data is so sharp.
To summarize these results, the marginal tax rate appears to have a small positive substi-
tution eect on tax evasion for individuals with substantial self-reported income. Estimated
evasion responses are much smaller than avoidance responses, although this decomposition is
likely to be biased by the presence of undetected evasion that the method would attribute to
avoidance. The combination of large evasion rates for self-reported income (as documented in
the previous section) and small evasion eects of the marginal tax rate is not incompatible with
economic theory as discussed in section 3. Importantly, the combined results from Section 5
and this section suggest that information reporting is much more important than low marginal
tax rates to achieve enforcement.
7 The Eects of Tax Enforcement on Evasion
7.1 Randomization Test
In this section, we consider the eects of audits and threat-of-audit letters on subsequent re-
porting. We start by running a randomization test to ensure that the treatment and control
groups are ex-ante identical in both experiments. Table 6 shows the results of the audit ran-
domization in Panel A (columns (1)-(4)) and the letter randomization in Panel B (columns
(5)-(8)). The table shows average incomes in dierent categories, percent of taxpayers with
non-zero incomes in dierent categories, the share of females, and average age. Notice that we
do not show self-employment income for the letter experiment, because this experiment was
implemented only for employees (dened as those with no self-employment income). Unlike the
baseline compliance study above, statistics are no longer estimated using population weights to
match the full Danish population, but reects instead the composition in the stratied random
sample on which the experiments are based. We use experimental weights so as to increase
25slightly the power of our results. This is the reason why the statistics for the 100% audit group
in column (1) are not the same as the statistics in Table 2.
For the audit randomization, income statistics are based on the tax returns led in 2007
for the 2006 tax year, i.e. right before the baseline audits were implemented. We see that the
dierences between the 0% and 100% audit groups are always very small and never statistically
signicant at the 5% level, showing that the randomization was indeed successful. For the letter
randomization, statistics are based on the pre-populated tax returns in 2008 with respect to
the 2007 tax year, i.e. right before the letter experiment was implemented.38 Among the 14
statistics we report, only one dierence (capital income) is statistically signicant at the 5%
level. Because we are looking are many statistics, it is not too surprising that at least one
dierence will be signicant at the 5% level. Hence, it appears that the letter randomization
was also successful.
7.2 The Eect of Audits on Future Reporting
It is useful to start by considering the eect of audits on future reporting in the context of the
economic model of tax evasion developed in Section 3. In that model, reported income depends
on the perceived probability of detection when engaging in tax evasion. Because tax audits are
rare events for a taxpayer, experiencing an audit is likely to provide new information and there-
fore lead to a change in the perceived probability of detection. We may think of the detection
probability as a product of two probabilities: the probability of audit and the probability of
detection conditional on audit. Audits may aect the perceived detection probability through
both channels. One would expect the eect on the perceived audit probability to be positive.
The eect on the perceived probability of detection conditional on audit is ambiguous, because
the taxpayer may learn that the tax administration is either more or less eective at uncov-
ering evasion than expected. However, because of the way the audit procedure works (in the
experiment and outside the experiment), it is most likely that the audits have a positive eect
on the perceived probability of detection conditional on being audited. This is because audited
38More precisely, the statistics are based on the last version of the return before the letters were sent out. As
the letters were distributed shortly after the pre-populated returns, the last return for most taxpayers was indeed
the pre-populated return. However, a minor fraction of taxpayers (about 17%) had already made self-reported
adjustments to their returns in the short time window between pre-populated returns and letters. To get rid of
the noise that this creates, we consider the eect of letters on adjustments to the latest return for each taxpayer
at the time of receiving the letter, and hence the randomization test is based on this tax return concept.
26taxpayers are contacted only if tax inspectors upon examining the return believe that hidden
income or unjustied deductions can potentially be uncovered. Hence, taxpayers are typically
only aware of being audited in cases where tax inspectors are successful. Hence, the probability
of detection conditional on audit (as well as the audit probability) is likely to increase as a result
of experiencing an audit, in which case the standard economic model predicts an increase in re-
ported income. In particular, we would expect to see increases in self-reported reported income,
but not necessarily in third-reported income where the probability of detection is already close
to one.
The few previous studies of the eect of audits on future reporting have not been able to
identify a signicant relationship between the two. These studies have considered either the
TCMP audits described in section 2 (Long and Schwartz, 1987) or ordinary audits (Erard,
1992) in the United States. The problem with using TCMP audit variation is that taxpayers
are aware that selection is random and that the audit is part of a special study. The problem
with using ordinary audit variation is that selection is endogenous and it is very dicult to
control for the ensuing selection bias in a convincing way. Our data contain more compelling
variation based on randomized audit treatments, but where participants are not aware of the
randomization.
As the experimental audits were implemented on tax returns led in 2007, we estimate the
eects of audits on subsequent reporting by comparing changes in led income from 2007 to
2008 (income earned in 2006 and 2007, respectively) in the 0% and 100% audit groups. Table
7 shows estimates for the probabilities of increasing led income (Panel A) and for the actual
income changes (Panel B) for dierent income components. For panel B, income changes have
been trimmed at -200,000 and +200,000 kroner in order to get rid of extreme observations that
would make estimates very imprecise.Less than 2% of observations are trimmed on average.
Column (1) shows the audit adjustment in the 100% audit group in the baseline year, i.e.
actual detected evasion. This column provides a useful benchmark against which we can compare
the estimated eects of audits on future reporting. Actual detectable evasion can be seen as
the amount of income that can be mechanically uncovered by a thorough tax audit, whereas
the eect on subsequent reported income can be seen as the extra amount of income that can
be recovered through a behavioral response to the perceived change in detection probability.
We start by considering the eect of audits on total reported income (columns (2) and (3)),
27and then break down the total eect into the eect on self-reported income (columns (4) and
(5)) and the eect on third-party reported income (columns (6) and (7)). In each case, we
show the year-ahead income change (i.e., probability of increase in Panel A, nominal amount of
change in Panel B) for the 0% audit group in the left column and the dierence in year-ahead
income changes between the 100% and 0% audit group in the right column.
For total net income and tax liability, we see that audits have a positive impact on subse-
quent reporting. The probability of increasing total net income and tax liability are almost 1
percentage point higher in the 100% audit group than in the 0% audit group. The tax liability
estimate is statistically signicant at the 5% level, while the net income estimate is marginally
signicant. The estimated eects on amounts are stronger. The eect on total net income
is 2554 kroner, or 45% of the baseline audit adjustment in the 100% group, and the result is
strongly signicant at the 5% level. The eect on tax liability is 1377 kroner, corresponding
to 55% of the baseline audit adjustment, and is also very signicant. These results show that
audits, in addition to mechanically increasing tax collection, generate substantial future tax
revenue through behavioral responses to a higher perceived probability of detection.
Considering the eects on each subcomponent of income, we see that the eects of audits are
generally positive with the only exception being a small negative (and statistically insignicant)
eect on the probability of increasing capital income. However, the estimates for most of the
subcomponents are quite small and several of them are statistically insignicant; only for self-
employment income is the eect large and statistically signicant. Because self-employment
income is almost fully self-reported, this suggests again that the informational setting is central
to tax enforcement eects on compliance.
To explore the role of information, we split the eect on total income into the eect on third-
party reported income and the eect on self-reported income in columns (4) to (7). For third-
party reported income, estimated eects of audits are always small and statistically insignicant
at the 5% level. This is also the case for the (small) part of self-employment income that is
subject to third-party reporting. For self-reported income, a very dierent picture emerges.
The eect on total net income is equal to 2322 kroner, corresponding to 91% of the total audit
eect. The eect on self-employment income is equal to 1804 kroner and the eect on stock
income is 633 kroner. All of these eects are strongly statistically signicant. For the probability
of increasing reported income, we nd strong and statistically signicant eects on total net
28income, self-employment income, and deductions, but not for stock income. For the remaining
items, we do not detect any signicant eects on amounts or probabilities.
We conclude that audits have signicant and substantial eects on subsequent reporting
of self-reported income, but negligible eects on the reporting of third-party income. This
is consistent with the simple economic model presented in Section 3 if experiencing an audit
raises the perceived probability of detection for self-reported items (where the probability is low
initially) but not for third-party reported items (where the probability is close to one initially).
7.3 The Eect of Threat-of-Audit Letters
We now turn to the eect of the threat-of-audit letters, which provide exogenous variation in the
probability of audit.39 As described above, the letters announce audit probabilities of either 50%
or 100% to randomly selected taxpayers in the full-audit and no-audit groups. In interpreting
the results, it is important to keep in mind that the probability of audit is not the same as
the probability of detection, which is the parameter that ultimately determines tax compliance
according to economic theory. The variation in the audit probability creates variation in the
detection probability, with the size of the variation depending on the probability of detection
conditional on being audited. The conditional probability of detection is unobservable, but is
likely to be quite low for self-reported income where tax inspectors have little hard information
to guide them in uncovering hidden income. Hence, while the audit probabilities being imposed
in the experiment are extremely high, the detection probabilities are much more modest and
the magnitude of the estimates should be interpreted in this light.
To study the eects of the threat-of-audit letters, we consider the sample of employees (as
the letter randomization did not include self-employed individuals), who led tax returns in
both 2007 and 2008, and who have an address on record so that they could be reached by mail.
Because taxpayers received the threat-of-audit letters shortly after receiving the pre-populated
return (P-event) and about one month prior to the ling deadline (F-event) in 2008, we focus
on the eect of letters on dierence between the P- and F-events in 2008 (for incomes earned in
39Besides the Minnesota tax experiment analyzed by Slemrod et al. (2001), audit-threat treatments have
been considered in various non-tax contexts. In the development literature, Olken (2007) looks at the eect
of audit threats on corruption in Indonesian village road projects. Recently, Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler
(2009) consider the eect of audit threats on compliance with TV license fee rules. Broadly related, papers in
the crime literature have studied the deterrence eect of policing in situations with quasi-random allocation of
policy forces (e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004).
292007). These are self-reported adjustments to the pre-populated return. As this return includes
all third-party information available to the government, the estimates should be interpreted as
eects on self-reported income.
To obtain sucient statistical power, we focus on the probability of changing incomes on
the pre-population return instead of eects on incomes per se. In general, and as can be seen in
Table 7, t-statistics are always much lower for income changes than for the fraction of taxpayers
changing income, because income amounts are widely dispersed and have large standard errors.
This makes it easier to detect eects on probabilities than on amounts.
The estimates are shown in Table 8. Column (1) establishes a baseline by showing the
probabilities of self-reported adjustments to the pre-populated return among those who did not
receive a letter. Columns (2)-(4) then show estimated letter eects for the entire sample of
employees (including both the 0% and 100% audit groups) and concerns the eect of receiving
any letter (50% and 100% letters together). Column (2) reports the dierence in adjustment
probabilities between the letter and no-letter groups, while columns (3) and (4) split the total
eect on adjustments into upward and downward adjustments. As in previous section, an
upward (downward) adjustment is dened as an adjustment increasing (decreasing) net income
and hence tax liability. As an adjustment is either upward or downward, column (2) is the sum
of columns (3) and (4). The following three ndings emerge.
First, there is a clear signicant eect of threat-of-audit letters on the probability of self-
reported income adjustments for almost all income components. For total net income, the
probability increases by 1.65 percentage points from a base of 13.37%, corresponding to an
increase of 12.3%. The eect is roughly similar for total tax paid. Interestingly, the eects
of letters are relatively stronger for income items that are rarely adjusted such as personal
income, capital income, and stock income. The percentage increase in adjustment probabilities
18.7% for personal income, 17.2% for capital income, 3.9% for deductions, and 51.5% for stock
income. The small eect on deduction is statistically insignicant. Second, the eect of letters
on adjustments reect almost exclusively upward adjustments of taxable income for all income
items. This is obviously consistent with the standard economic model: letters increase the
perceived probability of detection and therefore deter taxpayers from underreporting. Third,
the eect of letters on the probability of downward adjustment is close to zero for all income
items, and none of the eects are statistically signicant at the 5% level (only 1 of the 6 estimates
30have a t-statistic above 1).
We now turn to the results in columns (5)-(10), which split the sample by 100% audit and
0% audit in the baseline year. The broad conclusion from these estimates is that letter eects
tend to be stronger in the 0% audit group than in the 100% audit group. In particular, while the
letter eects in the 100% audit group are mostly insignicant, the eects in the 0% audit group
tend to be larger and most of them are statistically signicant. Notice that this discrepancy
between the two groups is consistent with our ndings from the audit experiment discussed in
the previous section. There we concluded that audits raise the perceived detection probability
in the following year. This implies that, when the letter treatment is implemented in the year
following the audits, the perceived probability of detection is already high among individuals in
the 100% audit group. This eectively weakens the letter treatment and provides an explanation
why eects are mostly insignicant in the 100% audit group.
For the 0% audit group, the percentage increase in the probability of any adjustment
(columns (5)/(1)) is equal to 17.8% for total net income, 15.4% for total tax liability, 38.2%
for personal income, 27.1% for capital income, 6.8% for deductions, and 48.5% for stock in-
come. The eects on upward adjustments are generally larger for the 0% audit group than for
the whole sample, and now all of the eects are statistically signicant. Interestingly, for the
0% audit group, letters now appear to have a small positive eect on downward adjustments,
although all except one (personal income) are still statistically insignicant. The presence of
downward adjustments is incompatible with the simple model presented in Section 3, but can
be understood by accounting for transaction costs associated with ling correctly. Filing correct
tax returns is costly given the complexity of the tax code, which may lead to honest mistakes
in both directions (under- and over-reporting). At the same time, if a return is not correct, the
taxpayer faces potential transaction costs of subsequently having to deal with tax inspectors.40
Therefore, tax lers who receive audit threats will rationally spend more resources ensuring that
the return is correct, which reduces ling errors in both directions and leads to a higher rate of
both upward and downward adjustments.
Finally, columns (11) and (12) in Table 8 explore the dierential impact of the 50% letter
40Consistent with this idea, the letters did generate complaints from tax lers who resented being chosen for
this special audit study. Presumably, the complainers were honest tax lers who did not plan to deliberately
evade taxes, because cheating tax lers would not have complained to SKAT for fear of the signal that this
would send to tax inspectors.
31and 100% letter. Column (11) shows the dierence in upward adjustment probabilities between
the 50%-letter and the no-letter groups, while column (12) shows the dierence in upward
adjustment probabilities between the 100%-letter and 50%-letter groups. We see a clear and
consistent dierence in the eects of the two types of letters, and the direction of the dierence
is consistent with the standard economic model. The dierential impact of the 100% letter over
the 50% letter tends to roughly similar to the impact of the 50% letter over no letter, implying
that a 100% audit probability has about twice the eect of a 50% audit probability.
To summarize the results in this section, audit threats have signicant and substantial eects
on the probability of upward adjustments of self-reported income. This is especially true for the
0% audit group, consistent with the nding in the previous section that the 100% audit group
has already reacted to the prior audit. The eect of a 100% audit probability letter is about
twice as large as the eect of a 50% audit probability letter. These results are consistent with
the simple economic model of evasion presented in Section 3.
8 Conclusion
The economics literature on tax evasion follows on the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), who considers a situation where a taxpayer decides how much income to self-report
facing a probability of audit and a penalty for cheating. Micro-simulations as well as laboratory
experiments show that, at realistic levels of audit probabilities and penalties, an AS-type setting
predicts much less compliance than we observe in practice, at least in developed countries. This
suggests that the AS-model misses important aspects of the real-world reporting environment,
and a number of dierent generalizations have been proposed and analyzed in the literature. In
particular, several authors have argued that observed compliance levels can only be explained by
accounting for psychological or cultural aspects of the reporting decision such as guilt, shame,
and a moral obligation to pay taxes.
While we do not deny the importance of psychological and cultural aspects in the decision
to evade on taxes, and indeed our results suggest that such factors may play a role, overall the
evidence presented in this paper points to a more classic information story. In particular, we
show that the key distinction in the taxpayer's reporting decision is whether income is subject to
third-party reporting or if it is solely self-reported. Augmenting the AS-model with third-party
reporting can account for most of our empirical ndings.
32For self-reported income, our empirical results t remarkably well with the basic AS-model:
tax evasion is substantial and responds negatively to an increase in the perceived detection
probability coming either from a prior audit or from a threat-of-audit letter. Interestingly,
evidence from bunching at kink points shows that the elasticity of tax evasion with respect to
the marginal tax rate is very modest relative to the elasticity of tax avoidance. This suggests
that rigorous tax enforcement is a much more eective tool to combat tax evasion than lowering
marginal tax rates.
For third party reported income, tax evasion is very modest and does not respond to per-
ceived audit probabilities because the probability of detection is already very high due to sys-
tematic record matching. This shows that third-party reporting is an extremely eective en-
forcement device. Given the very costly nature of tax audits, we conclude that enforcement
resources are better spent on third-party information reporting than on traditional audits of
self-reported items. This also suggests that more work is needed in building a tax enforcement
theory that centers on third-party reporting by rms (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2009) and
to explore the role of rms in tax systems more generally (Gordon and Li, 2005; Kopczuk and
Slemrod, 2006).
33References
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972). \Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis." Journal of Public Economics 1, 323-338.
Alm, James, Betty R. Jackson, and Michael McKee (1992a). \Estimating the Determi-
nants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data." National Tax Journal 45, 107-114.
Alm, James, Betty R. Jackson, and Michael McKee (1992b). \Deterrence and Beyond:
Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS," in J. Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance
and Enforcement, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.
Alm, James, B. R. Jackson, and M. McKee (2008). \Getting the Word Out: Enforcement
Information Dissemination and Compliance Behavior." Journal of Public Economics (in press).
Alm, James, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze (1992). \Why Do People
Pay Taxes?" Journal of Public Economics 48, 21-38.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and J. Feinstein (1998). \Tax Compliance." Journal of
Economic Literature 36, 818-860.
Beck, Paul J., Jon S. Davis, and Woon-Oh Jung (1991). \Experimental Evidence on
Taxpayer Reporting under Uncertainty." Accounting Review 66, 535-558.
Becker, Gary S. (1968). \Crime and Punishment|An Economic Approach." Journal of
Political Economy 76, 169-217.
Becker, Winfried, Heinz-Juergen Buchner, and Simon Sleeking (1987). \The Impact
of Public Transfer Expenditures on Tax Evasion; an Experimental Approach." Journal of Public
Economics 34, 243-252.
Beron, Kurt J., Helen V. Tauchen, and Ann D. Witte (1992). \The Eect of Audits
and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance," in J. Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax
Compliance and Enforcement, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.
Bloomquist, Kim M. (2003). \Tax Evasion, Income Inequality and Opportunity Costs of
Compliance", 96th National Tax Association Conference.
Blumenthal, Marsha, Charles Christian, and Joel Slemrod (2001). \Do Normative Ap-
peals Aect Tax Compliance? Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota" National
Tax Journal 54(1), 125-138.
Chetty, Raj (2009). \Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sucient to Calculate Deadweight
Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance." American Economic Journal: Economic
34Policy 1, 31-52.
Chetty, Raj, John Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri (2009). \Adjustment
Costs, Firm Responses, and Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records."
NBER Working Paper #15617, December 2009.
Christian, Charles W. (1994). \Voluntary Compliance with the Individual Income Tax:
Results from the 1988 TCMP Study." In the IRS Research Bulletin, 1993/1994, Publication
1500 (Rev. 9-94), 35-42. Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
Clotfelter, Charles T. (1983). \Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual
Returns," Review of Economics and Statistics 65(3), 363{73.
Cowell, Frank (1990). Cheating the Government. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Di Tella, Rafael and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2004). \Do police reduce crime? Estimates
using the allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack." American Economic Review 94,
115{133.
Dubin, Jerey, Michael Graetz, Louis Wilde (1988). \An Empirical Analysis of Federal
Income Tax Auditing and Compliance." National Tax Journal 41, 61-74.
Dubin, Jerey, Michael Graetz, Louis Wilde (1990). \The eect of audit rates on the
federal individual income tax, 1977-1986." National Tax Journal 43, 395-409.
Erard, Brian (1992). \The Inuence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior," in Joel Slemrod
(ed.), Why people pay taxes: Tax compliance and enforcement. University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor.
Feinstein, Jonathan (1991). \An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its De-
tection." Rand Journal of Economics 22, 14-35.
Feld, Lars P. and Bruno S. Frey (2002). \Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated."
Economics of Governance 3, 87-99.
Feld, Lars P. and Bruno S. Frey (2006). \Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological
Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation." Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 287, April 2006.
Feldman, Naomi and Joel Slemrod (2007). \Estimating Tax Noncompliance with Evidence
from Unaudited Tax Returns," Economic Journal, March 2007, 327-352.
Fellner, Gerlinde, Rupert Sausgruber, and Christian Traxler (2009). \Testing Enforce-
ment Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information." Max Planck
35Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper 2009-3, September 2009.
Friedland, Nehemiah, Shlomo Maital, and Aryeh Rutenberg (1978). \A Simulation
Study of Income Tax Evasion." Journal of Public Economics 10, 107-116.
Gordon, Roger and Wei Li (2005) \Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles
and a Possible Explanation," NBER Working Paper No. 11661, forthcoming Journal of Public
Economics.
Internal Revenue Service (1996). Federal Tax Compliance Research: Individual Income Tax
Gap Estimates for 1985, 1988, and 1992, IRS Publication 1415 (Rev. 4-96), Washington, D.C.
Internal Revenue Service (2006). Updated Estimates of the Tax Year 2001 Individual Income
Tax Underreporting Gap. Overview, Washington, D.C.
Klepper, Steven and Daniel Nagin (1989). \The Anatomy of Tax Evasion," Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 5(1), 1-24.
Kleven, Henrik, Claus Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez (2009). \Why Can Modern Gov-
ernments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries." NBER Working
Paper 15218, August 2009.
Kleven, Henrik and Esben Anton Schultz (2010). \Estimating Taxable Income Responses
Using Danish Tax Reforms." Working Paper, 2010.
Kopczuk, Wojciech, and Joel Slemrod (2006). \Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory",
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 96(2), 130-134.
Long, Susan and Richard Schwartz (1987). \The Impact of IRS Audits on Taxpayer
Compliance: A Field Experiment in Specic Deterrence." Paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Law and Society Association, Washington, D.C.
Long, Susan, and Judyth Swingden (1990). \Third-Party Information Reporting and
Compliance." In Research Conference Report, How Do We Aect Taxpayer Behavior?, Internal
Revenue Service Document 7302 (3-91), Washington, D.C.
Olken, Benjamin (2007). \Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in
Indonesia." Journal of Political Economy 115, 200-249.
Pommerehne, Werner W. and Bruno Frey (1992). \The Eects of Tax Administration
on Tax Morale." Unpublished manuscript, University of Saarbrucken.
Saez, Emmanuel (2009). \Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?" American Economic Jour-
nal: Economic Policy (forthcoming).
36Sandmo, Agnar (2005). \The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View." National Tax
Journal 58, 643-63.
Shaw, Jonathan, Joel Slemrod, and John Whiting (2008). \Administration and Com-
pliance." IFS Working Paper, forthcoming in Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century:
The Mirrlees Review.
Slemrod, Joel (1995). \Income Creation or Income Shifting? Behavioral Responses to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85, 175-180.
Slemrod, Joel(2001). \A general model of the behavioral response to taxation," International
Tax and Public Finance 8(2), 119-128.
Slemrod, Joel(2007). \Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21, Winter, 25-48.
Slemrod, Joel, Marsha Blumenthal, and Charles Christian (2001). \Taxpayer response
to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota."
Journal of Public Economics 79, 455-483.
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki (2002). \Tax avoidance, evasion and administration,"
in A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier:
Amsterdam.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1974). \A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal
of Public Economics 3, 201-202.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1987), \On the excess burden of tax evasion", Public Finance Quarterly
15(2), 123-137.
37Figure 1: Probability of Detection under Third-Party Reporting
detection 













income incomeFigure 2. Overview of Experimental Design
100% Audit Group 0% Audit Group
May 1, 2007
Audit of 2006 return No audit
Oct 1, 2007
y,
Taxpayers informed about audit 
result [in case of irregularities]
No
action


















Audit of half of No A u d i to fa l l Audit of half of No A u d i to fa l l
Aug 1, 2008




Audit of all 
2007 returns




Audit of all 
2007 returns

































200000 300000 400000 500000
Taxable Income




































Before Audit After Audit
B. Stock-Income
 
Figure 3. Density Distributions around Kink Points 
The figure displays number of taxpayers (by 3000DKK bins) for taxable income for the self-employed 
(Panel A) and stock income (Panel B). In both panels, we report the series for incomes before audits (in 
black) and incomes after audits (in red) for the 100% audit group. The vertical line denotes the kink point 
where marginal tax rates jump. The jump is from 47% to 62% in panel A (top taxable income bracket) and 
from 28% to 43% in Panel B (top stock income bracket). In both cases, there is strong bunching at the kink 
which is evidence of behavioral responses to taxes. Bunching for pre-audit incomes captures both evasion 
and avoidance responses while bunching for after-audit income captures only avoidance response. Excess 








B. Tax Rates and Tax Bases
Tax Type Tax Base Bracket (DKK) Tax Rate
(1) Payroll Tax Labor Income All income 8.0%
(2) National Income Tax Personal Income + max(Capital Income,0) 38,500-265,500 5.5%
265,500-318,700 11.0%
318,700- 26.5% [1]
(3) Regional Income Tax Taxable Income 38,500- 32.6% [2]
(4) Stock Income Tax Stock Income 0-44,400 28.0%
44,400- 43.0%
Table 1. Danish Individual Income Tax in 2006
Notes: All amounts in Danish kroner: US $1 = 5.2 DKK as of January 2010.
Salary, wages, honoraria, fees, bonuses, fringe benefits, business earnings
Labor Income (1) + social transfers, grants, awards, gifts, received alimony - payroll tax, and 
certain pension contributions.
Interest income, rental income, business capital income - interest on debt (mortgage, bank 
loans, credit cards, student loans)
Commuting costs, union fees, unemployment contributions, other work related expenditures, 
charitable contributions, alimony paid
= Personal income (2) + Capital income (3) - Deductions (4)
Dividends and realized capital gains from corporate stock
[3]: The national and regional income taxes are based on individual income (not family income). The stock income tax is based on
family income with brackets twice as large for married tax filers than those reported in the table. 
[2]: The regional tax includes municipal and county taxes in 2006. The rate shown is the average across all municipalities, and
includes the optional church tax equal to 0.7%.
[1]: the top rate is reduced so that the combined national and regional income top marginal tax rate never exceeds 59%. The top






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Net Income and Total Tax
Net Income  98.4 206,038 3,744 4,255 -511 195,969 536 10,069 3,719
(0.09) (2,159) (439) (424) (132) (1,798) (80) (1,380) (416)
Total Tax 90.8 69,940 1,670 1,782 -112
(0.21) (1,142) (223) (222) (21)
Positive and Negative Income
Positive Income 98.2 243,984 3,449 3,719 -271 223,882 536 20,102 3,183
(0.09) (2,511) (437) (419) (122) (1,860) (80) (1,693) (411)
Negative Income 79.1 -37,946 296 536 -240 -27,913 -10,033 536
(0.29) (1,014) (73) (53) (50) (406) (862) (53)
Income Components
Personal Income  95.2 209,681 2,343 2,472 -128 211,244 475 -1,563 1,997
(0.15) (1,473) (402) (401) (34) (1,385) (78) (540) (393)
Capital Income 93.9 -11,075 156 335 -178 -14,556 33 3,481 302
(0.17) (340) (160) (56) (150) (602) (7) (542) (55)
Deductions  60.1 -9,098 129 206 -77 -5,666 -3,432 206
(0.35) (104) (18) (16) (10) (48) (85) (16)
Stock Income 22.5 5,635 274 308 -33 3,783 31 1,852 276
(0.30) (1,405) (48) (46) (12) (976) (12) (943) (45)
Self-Employment  7.6 10,398 838 1,086 -248 1,164 10 9,234 1,075
(0.19) (812) (124) (130) (60) (177) (4) (816) (130)
Table 2. Audit Adjustments Decomposition 
All estimates are population weighted and based solely on the 100% audit group (19,680 observations). Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
Top panel reports net income (sum of all positive income components minus all negative income components and other deductions) and total
tax. Middle panel reports positive income (sum of all positive income components) and negative income (sum of all negative income components
and deductions). Bottom panel displays various income components. Personal income is earnings, pensions, alimony, minus some retirement
contributions. Capital income is interest income, returns on bonds, net rents, minus all interest payments. Deductions include work related
expenses, union fees, charitable contributions, alimony paid, and various smaller items. Stock income includes dividends and realized capital
gains on stocks. Self-employment income is net profits from unincorporated businesses. Net income is personal income, capital income, stock
income, self-employment income, foreign income (not reported specifically), minus deductions. 
Notes: Column (1) reports the percent of filers with non-zero pre-audit amounts in column (2). Columns (2) to (9) report amounts in Danish
Kroner (US $1 = DKK 5.2 as of 1/2010) and negative amounts are reported in negative. Column (2) displays income or tax reported before
audits, column (3) displays the net audit adjustment, column (4) displays under-reporting in the audit adjustment (upward audit adjustments
increasing tax liability), column (5) displays over-reporting in the audit adjustment (downwardaudit adjustments decreasing tax liability). Note that
(4)+(5)=(3). Column (6) displays third-party income, column (7) displays third-party income under-reporting (defined as upward audit adjustments
in case where third party income is higher than final reported income for positive income items), column (8) displays self-reported income
(defined as total reported income minus third-party reported income), column (9) displays self-reported income under-reporting (defined all
upward audit adjustments net of third-party income under-reporting). Note that (6)+(8)=(2) and (7)+(9)=(4).









A. Positive Income subject to Third-Party Reporting and Withholding
All items 216,801 400 0.18
(1,616) (75)
Earnings, Pensions, and Transfers 212,642 400 0.19
(1,223) (75)
Other items 4,159 2 0.05
=all items minus Earnings, Pensions, Transfers (978) (3)
B. Positive Income subject to Third-Party Reporting without Withholding
All items 7,081 148 2.10
(769) (26)
Notes: Column (1) displays third-party income amounts, column (2) displays third-party income under-reporting 
(defined as upward audit adjustments in case where third party income is higher than final reported income for 
positive income items). Column (3) is the evasion rate defined as (2)/(1).
Panel A presents results for positive income subject to both third-party reporting and tax withholding at source. It 
first reports total such income and then divides such income between two categories (a) earnings, pensions, and 
transfers (b) all other items. Panel B presents positive income subject to third-party reporting but without tax 
withholding at source.
All estimates are population weighted. Amounts are in Danish Kroner (US $1 = 5.2 DKK). Standard errors 
reported in parenthesis.
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 14.42 11.92 1.44 3.98 9.16 6.68 0.23 1.55
(0.64) (0.66) (0.25) (0.62) (0.85) (0.95) (0.82) (1.10)
Female Dummy -5.76 -4.45 -2.05 -5.45 -3.76 -1.88
(0.43) (0.45) (0.41) (0.43) (0.46) (0.43)
Married Dummy 1.55 -0.36 -1.64 -0.71 -2.13 -2.18
(0.46) (0.48) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46)
Member of church -1.98 -2.67 -1.19 -1.91 -2.48 -1.72
(0.59) (0.58) (0.54) (0.59) (0.58) (0.55)
Geographical Location Copenhagen dummy -0.29 1.20 1.00 6 location p-value p-value p-value
(0.67) (0.67) (0.62) dummies 0.02 0.03 1.72
Age  Age>45 dummy -0.37 -0.35 0.10 4 age group p-value p-value p-value
(0.45) (0.45) (0.42) dummies 0.00 0.00 17.59
Home Ownership 5.96 -0.35 3.77 -1.31
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
Firm Size Firm size<10 dummy 4.43 2.97 5 firm size  p-value p-value
(0.82) (0.76) dummies 0.00 0.00
Industrial Sector Informal sector dummy 3.25 -0.99 22 industry p-value p-value
(0.86) (0.79) dummies 0.00 0.00
Self-Reported Income Dummy 9.47 9.72 7.91 8.04
(0.53) (0.54) (0.56) (0.57)
(Self-Reported Income>20,000DKK) 17.46 17.08 9.51 8.56
(0.91) (0.92) (1.07) (1.07)
(Self-Reported Income<-10,000DKK) 14.63 14.53 14.15 13.72
(0.72) (0.72) (0.71) (0.72)
Auditing Flag Dummy 15.48 15.32 14.17 14.23
(0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Self-Employed Dummy 12.33 10.82
(0.90) (1.19)
Capital Income Dummy 0.61 1.04
(0.84) (0.87)
Stock Income Dummy 1.75 2.51
(0.49) (0.50)
Deduction Dummy 0.67 0.97
(0.51) (0.60)
Audit Adjustment in 2004 or 2005 Dummy 9.19 8.59
(0.88) (0.88)
Income controls 6 income p-value p-value
group dummies 0.00 0.00
R-square 1.07% 2.14% 17.14% 17.44% 2.24% 6.44% 19.16% 20.05%
Adjusted R-square 1.04% 2.10% 17.13% 17.39% 2.19% 6.26% 19.10% 19.83%
Table 4. Probability of Audit Adjustments: Socio-economics vs. Tax Return Factors
Notes: This table reports coefficients of the OLS regression of an audit adjustment dummy on various dummy regressors. Bottom rows report the R-square and adjusted R-squares. All
estimates are population weighted and based solely on the 100% audit group (19,680 observations). Standard errors reported in parenthesis. In Panel A (columns (1) to (4)), we include a
basic set of dummy variables, while a richer set of variables is included in Panel B (columns (5) to (8)). In Panel B, we do not report the full set of coefficients for geographical, age, firm size,
industrial sector, and income groups. We instead only report the p-value from an F-test that the coefficients of those dummies are all equal to zero (for each category). The 6 location
dummies are defined as Copenhagen, North Sealand, Middle and South Sealand, South Denmark, Middle Jutland, and North Jutland. The 4 age dummies are for age groups 0-25, 26-45, 46-
65, 66+. The 5 firm size dummies are for firms' size: 1, 2-10, 11-100, 101-1000, 1001+. The 6 income group dummies are for each of the bottom three quartiles separately, percentile 75 to
95, percentile 95 to 99, and top percentile.  For income categories, self-employed dummy means non zero self-employment income, etc.

















(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Self-Employment Income (MTR jump from 47% to 62% at 318,700 DKK)
Fraction bunching (percent) 19.12 14.16 4.96 7.50
(0.90) (0.79) (1.20) (1.85)
Elasticity 0.161 0.103 0.058 0.056
(0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of observations 1,919 1,942 3,861 2,320
B. Stock Income (MTR jump from 28% to 43% at 88,600 DKK)
Fraction bunching (percent) 39.30 36.42 2.88 1.80
(2.22) (2.11) (3.06) (3.69)
Elasticity 2.243 1.996 0.247 0.120
(0.213) (0.191) (0.286) (0.259)
Number of observations 486 519 1,005 737
In each panel, the second row estimates the (compensated) elasticity of reported income with respect to the net-of-tax rate using
bunching evidence (following the method developed in Saez, 2009). Column (1) is the elasticity for before audit income while
column (2) is the elascity for after audit income. Column (3) reports the difference between column (2) and column (1). Column
(4) presents as a robustness check the difference in elasticities when the sample is limited to tax filers within 20,000 DKK
(instead of 40,000 DKK) of the kink. The elasticity of before audit income combines both the evasion and avoidance elasticities
while the elasticity of after audit income is the tax avoidance elasticity. Therefore, the difference in elasticities is the compensated
elasticity of tax evasion with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
In each panel, the first row estimates the fraction of tax filers bunching (income within 1500 DKK of the kink) among tax filers with
income within 40,000 DKK of the kink. Column (1) is for income before audit while column (2) is for income after audit. Column
(3) reports the difference between column (1) and column (2). Column (4) presents a robustness check the difference when the
sample is limited to tax filers within 20,000 DKK (instead of 40,000 DKK) of the kink.
Table 5. Tax Evasion vs. Tax Avoidance Elasticities
Baseline Differences
Notes: This table estimates the effects of marginal tax rates on tax evasion vs. tax avoidance using bunching evidence around
kink points of the tax schedule where marginal tax rates jump. Panel A focuses on the self-employed and the top rate kink where
marginal tax rates jump from 47% to 62% at 318,700 DKK. Panel B focuses on stock-income and the top rate kink for stock-
income where marginal tax rates from 28 to 43% at 88,600 DKK for married filers and 44,300 DKK for single filers (we have
aligned single filers by multiplying by two their stock income). As shown in Figure 2, in both cases, there is significant evidence of



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Income  265,069 263,485 -1,584 (5,996) 239,858 244,559 4,701 (3,415)
Total Tax 100,909 100,460 -449 (2,991) 82,444 84,245 1,801 (1,583)
Personal Income  216,048 216,993 946 (2,345) 255,923 258,842 2,918 (2,887)
Capital Income -13,132 -12,805 327 (1,015) -16,647 -15,439 1,208 (532)
Deductions  -11,838 -11,976 -138 (160) -8,364 -8,287 76 (159)
Stock Income 17,998 15,880 -2,118 (4,869) 7,656 8,101 445 (1,778)
Self-Employment  55,616 54,960 -656 (2,869)
Female (%) 39.93 39.59 -0.33 (0.47) 49.82 50.10 0.28 (0.67)
Age 49.28 49.43 0.14 (0.16) 49.10 48.90 -0.20 (0.25)
% with Net Income 99.55 99.52 -0.03 (0.07) 98.70 98.65 -0.05 (0.15)
% with Total Tax 96.72 96.61 -0.11 (0.17) 96.61 96.27 -0.34 (0.25)
% with Personal Income  94.87 94.73 -0.14 (0.21) 97.19 97.04 -0.15 (0.23)
% with Capital Income 95.67 95.40 -0.27 (0.20) 96.97 96.92 -0.05 (0.23)
% with Deductions  71.68 71.76 0.07 (0.44) 64.22 64.48 0.26 (0.64)
% with Stock Income 40.30 40.23 -0.07 (0.47) 44.15 43.59 -0.56 (0.67)
% with Self-Employment  40.18 40.37 0.19 (0.47)
Number of observations 23,148 19,630 42,778 9,449 15,339 24,788
In panel B, the sample is restricted to tax filers with no self-employment in base year as the letter experiment was limited to tax
filers with no self-employment income. Estimates are weighted according to the experiment stratification design. Weights do not
reflect population weights. All the amounts are in Danish Kroner (US $1 = DKK 5.2 as of 1/2010).
Table 6. Randomization Checks: Audit and Letter experiments
A. Audit randomization B. Letter Randomization
Notes: This table presents randomization checks for the audit experiment (panel A, cols. (1) to (4)) and the letter experiment
(panel B, cols. (5) to (8)). Panel A compares baseline reported incomes in 2006 (before the audit experiment took place). Columns
(1) and (2) present the baseline averages for the treatment group and control group respectively. Column (3) presents the
difference between the treatment group and the control group. The standard error of the difference is presented in column (4).
Panel B compares pre-populated tax returns for 2007 incomes before the letters are sent. The columns are constructed as in
Panel A.Baseline
Audit adjustment in 
100% audit group
Increase in 0% audit 
group
Difference 100% audit 
vs. 0% audit
Increase in 0% audit 
group
Difference 100% audit 
vs. 0% audit
Increase in 0% audit 
group
Difference 100% audit 
vs. 0% audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Probability of Income Increase from 2006 to 2007 (percent)
Net Income  21.95 60.84 0.90 37.47 2.11 59.30 0.24
(0.30) (0.33) (0.48) (0.32) (0.48) (0.33) (0.48)
Total Tax 21.41 56.14 0.99
(0.29) (0.33) (0.49)
Personal Income  2.84 63.74 0.29 11.24 0.41 63.55 0.38
(0.12) (0.32) (0.47) (0.21) (0.31) (0.32) (0.47)
Capital Income 4.24 44.55 -0.03 22.24 0.39 43.45 0.18
(0.14) (0.33) (0.49) (0.28) (0.41) (0.33) (0.49)
Deductions  4.43 27.87 0.69 17.46 0.93 20.14 0.15
(0.15) (0.30) (0.44) (0.25) (0.38) (0.27) (0.39)
Stock Income 1.64 23.67 0.53 5.44 0.19 23.24 0.39
(0.09) (0.28) (0.42) (0.15) (0.22) (0.28) (0.42)
Self-Employment  14.49 20.19 1.62 20.20 1.53 3.46 0.13
(0.25) (0.27) (0.40) (0.27) (0.40) (0.12) (0.18)
B. Amount of Income Change from 2006 to 2007
Net Income  5629 4444 2554 1696 2322 2748 232
(497) (536) (787) (448) (658) (467) (691)
Total Tax 2510 2013 1377
(165) (319) (464)
Personal Income  592 7207 168 -442 -144 7649 313
(147) (435) (638) (190) (277) (410) (604)
Capital Income 145 -3616 68 2575 -47 -6191 114
(456) (185) (275) (207) (306) (202) (299)
Deductions  102 205 167 -145 107 350 60
(23) (70) (101) (70) (101) (23) (33)
Stock Income 485 805 508 -88 633 893 -125
(71) (202) (293) (165) (237) (133) (195)
Self-Employment  4287 71 1745 587 1804 -516 -59
(286) (387) (571) (390) (579) (135) (204)
For panel B, all the amounts are in Danish Kroner (US $1 = DKK 5.2 as of 1/2010). Income changes are trimmed at -200,000 DKK and 200,000 DKK. That is, income changes are defined as
min(200000,max(income in 2007-income in 2006,-200000). This is done to avoid extreme outcomes which make estimates very imprecise. Less than 2% of observations are trimmed on average.
All income items are estimated for the full sample (40,602 observations). Estimates are weighted according to the experiment stratification design. Weights do not reflect population weights. Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 7. Effects of Prior Audits on Year to Year Income Changes
Notes: This table reports the effects of prior-audits on income changes from 2006 to 2007. Panel A focuses on the probability of a (nominal) income increase while Panel B focuses on the amounts of
income changes. Column (1) reports the fraction with an audit adjustment in the 100% audit group in base year (Panel A) and the average amount of the audit adjustment in base year (Panel B). Columns
(2) reports the fraction with an income increase from 2006 to 2007 (Panel A) or the average income increase from 2006 to 2007 (Panel B) for the 0% audit group. Column (3) reports the difference between
the 100% audit group and the 0% audit group in the fraction with an income increase from 2006 to 2007 (Panel A) or the average income increase from 2006 to 2007 (Panel B). Each row corresponds to a
given income items. The complete definition of each income item is given in Table 2. Columns (4)-(5) repeat the analysis of cols. (2)-(3) limited to self-reported incomes instead of total reported income.
Columns (6)-(7) repeat the analysis limited to third-party reported incomes instead of total reported income. 
Total Income Change Self-Reported Income Change Third-Party Reported Income ChangeNo Letter Group
50% Letter - 
No letter
100% Letter - 
50% letter


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net Income  13.37 1.65 1.51 0.13 2.38 1.54 0.83 0.91 1.49 -0.57 1.04 0.95
(0.35) (0.47) (0.28) (0.40) (0.62) (0.37) (0.53) (0.72) (0.44) (0.61) (0.33) (0.33)
Total Tax 13.67 1.56 1.54 0.01 2.11 1.67 0.44 1.00 1.42 -0.41 0.99 1.10
(0.35) (0.48) (0.28) (0.40) (0.63) (0.37) (0.53) (0.73) (0.44) (0.61) (0.33) (0.33)
Personal Income  2.51 0.47 0.31 0.16 0.96 0.48 0.49 -0.01 0.14 -0.16 0.26 0.09
(0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.34) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19)
Capital Income 4.43 0.76 0.76 -0.01 1.20 1.04 0.16 0.31 0.49 -0.18 0.52 0.48
(0.21) (0.29) (0.24) (0.17) (0.38) (0.31) (0.23) (0.45) (0.37) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Deductions  9.00 0.35 0.28 0.07 0.61 0.35 0.26 0.09 0.22 -0.13 0.16 0.24
(0.29) (0.39) (0.08) (0.38) (0.51) (0.10) (0.50) (0.60) (0.13) (0.58) (0.10) (0.10)
Stock Income 1.32 0.68 0.64 0.04 0.64 0.48 0.16 0.71 0.80 -0.09 0.56 0.17
(0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.08) (0.23) (0.20) (0.10) (0.28) (0.25) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19)
Number of obs. 9,449 24,788 24,788 24,788 14,145 14,145 14,145 10,643 10,643 10,643 24,788 24,788
The sample includes only tax filers who did not have any self-employment income in base year (as tax filers with self-employment income were not part of the letter experiment).
Estimates are weighted according to the experiment stratification design. Weights do not reflect population weights. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 8. Threat-of-Audit Letter Effects on Probability of Adjusting Reported Income (in percent)
Notes: Column (1) reports the fraction (in percent) of tax filers which adjust a given income item (listed on the left hand side rows) among those did not receive the letter. For
each income component listed on the left column (see footnote of Table 2 for complete definitions), the table reports the effects of letters on the probability that the tax filer
adjusts the reported income when filing his/her income tax return. Column (2) reports the difference in fraction adjusting between the letter and no letter groups. Column (3)
reports the difference in fraction adjusting upward while column (4) reports the difference in fraction adjusting downward ((3)+(4)=(2)). Cols. (5), (6), (7) repeat cols. (2), (3), (4)
but limiting the sample to those not audited in base year (0% audit group). Cols. (8), (9), (10) repeat cols. (2), (3), (4) but limiting the sample to those audited in base year (100%
audit group). Column (11) reports the difference in adjustments between the letter group with 50% audit probability and the no letter group. Column (12) reports the difference in
adjustments between the letter group with 100% audit probability and the letter group with 50% audit probability.
Both 0% and 100% audit groups 0% audit group only
Differences Letter Group vs. No Letter Group
100% audit group only
Both 0% and 100% 
audit groups